降低公共危机防控成本刍议

公共危机防控这一非常态下特殊公共服务所面临的多方面需求与供给能力相对较低的矛盾,是导致公共危机防控成本高昂、难以控制和难以衡量的主要原因.当前,要降低公共危机的防控成本,需要着力于观念形塑、完善政府问责制、实现复合治理和能力建设等方面.     

我国地方财政困境辨析

地方政府是一国政府体系中极为重要的组成部分，地方政府职能作用的合理化和地方财政的有效运行是衡量一国整体财政运行质量的重要指标。随着中国经济体制改革和现代化建设的推进，地方财政尤其是县乡财政的困境问题日益凸现，成为中国市场经济条件下建立健全公共财政框架的一个桎梏。通过从中国地方财政困境的现状入手，着重分析了这种困境形成的多方面原因，并进而提出化解困境的几点对策建议。     

促进我国旅游业发展的财税对策探讨

改革开放至今,我国旅游业进行了近30年的探索,但在树立绿色税收、绿色财政理念,搭建适合旅游业发展的财税政策平台,创建生态旅游强国,还任重道远.在探讨加速我国旅游资源整合,促进旅游资源优势向经济优势转变基础上,提出实现旅游行业经济效益和社会效益双赢的财税政策.     

公诉转自诉制度问题

公诉转自诉制度实质上是被害人对公诉机关公诉权的制约问题，我国选择的制约方式是公诉转自诉，即在特定条件下将公诉案件转化为自诉案件的一种制度。1997年以后的司法实践证明该制度的司法程序不能顺利进行，被害人的利益无法得到保护。所以笔者建议以被害人司法审查制度代替公诉转自诉制度。     

How does news sentiment affect the states of Japanese stock return volatility?

This paper examines the impact of public news sentiment on the volatility states of firm-level returns on the Japanese Stock market. We firstly adopt a novel Markov Regime Switching Long Memory GARCH (MRS-LMGARCH), which is employed to estimate the latent volatility states of intraday stock return. By using the RavenPack Dow Jones News Analytics database, we fit discrete choice models to investigate the impact of news sentiment on changes of volatility states of the constituent stocks in the TOPIX Core 30 Index. Our findings suggest that news occurrence and sentiment, especially those of macro-economic news, are a key factor that significantly drives the volatility state of Japanese stock returns. This provides essential information for traders of the Japanese stock market to optimize their trading strategies and risk management plans to combat volatility.     

我国公司法定类型的反思及逻辑建构

自公司诞生以来,公司这一组织形式就受到各国商业实践和立法的特别重视。各国商事立法均对公司类型加以规定,并分门别类地对公司设立、股东权利、公司治理等进行相应规范。虽然商事逻辑的共通性拉近了各国立法上的公司类型,但各国在公司法定类型及相应公司规制上的差异仍旧鲜明。这也反映在我国学界对公司法定类型的争议上。我国公司法定类型改革应坚持本土商业实践逻辑,并确保改革成本最小化。由此,保留有限责任公司和股份有限公司,并按公司规模大小进一步区分出大型公司与小型公司,就成为理性选择的结果。具体而言,在有限责任公司中,增设大型公司,明确大型公司认定标准,并在公司机关设置、财务会计制度等方面给予相对严格的例外规定;在股份有限公司中,增设小型公司,对其赋予更加灵活、便捷的自治,并将上市公司扩增为公众公司。     

General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

基于公共财政构架下财政支出结构的优化

现阶段我国要建立与市场机制相适应的公共财政，就必须科学界定公共财政支出范围，优化财政支出结构，这样才能提高财政支出效率，降低政府运作成本，减少对竞争性领域的财政投资，强化公益性事业支出，最终实现支出结构的优化调整.